




The Treaty of Rome and subsequent EU treaties insist on
the principle that national governments should not dis-
criminate against residents of other member states.
Economists claim that such a principle buttresses effi-
ciency. It is inefficient, for example, to favour a national
firm in public procurement if a foreign firm can supply
the same good at a lower cost.
Yet we have observed in recent years a number of inci-
dents where individual countries have pursued nationalis-
tic economic policies despite their pledge. Governments
have intervened in financial markets so as to block or
modify cross-border mergers involving prominent domes-
tic firms. Attempts to subsidise
national champions or to recapitalise
and bail out national losers are still
common. Economic nationalism is
not only frequently observed within
the EU, in violation of European or
wider treaties. Two recent examples
include the failed acquisition of US
ports by Dubai-based DP World and
the renegotiation of quotas of
Chinese imports immediately after
their phasing out.
In this chapter we discuss the merits
and drawbacks of economic nation-
alism, its causes and consequences,
and whether it should be combated –
and with which tools. The criterion
we use to evaluate economic nation-
alism is whether it improves or
worsens the welfare of European cit-
izens.
2. Forms of economic nationalism
What is economic nationalism? We
define it as any form of interference
from governments in private trans-
actions that distorts them on the basis of the nationality
of the parties, and that go beyond the normal, non-dis-
criminatory reflection of domestic residents’preferences.
Thus, having a national tax system different from other
countries, as the result of different preferences and a dif-
ferent economic structure, is not a case of economic
nationalism. But launching an anti-trust action against a
foreign-owned firm, while being at the same time lenient
with domestic monopolies, is a case of economic nation-
alism. Such policies, while discriminatory, may never-
theless be consistent with benevolent governments trying
to maximise the welfare of their citizens, as we shall see,
although in many cases the motivation has probably
more to do with private rent seeking, which we also dis-
cuss below.
These interventions are quite often discretionary in that
they consist of a sequence of one-off interventions rather
Box 6.1 
Nationalism and the location of the European Parliament 
The Wikipedia article on the European Parliament succinctly describes this 
phenomenon. 
“Although Brussels is generally treated as the ‘capital’ of the European Union, … 
a protocol attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam requires that the European 
Parliament have monthly sessions in Strasbourg. However, preparatory 
legislative work and committee meetings take place in Brussels. Moreover, much 
of the European Parliament's secretariat, which employs the majority of its staff, 
is located in Luxembourg, which itself used to host plenary sessions of the 
parliament. 
Parliament only spends four days of each month in Strasbourg in order to take its 
final, plenary votes. Additional plenary meetings are held in Brussels. On several 
occasions, the European Parliament has expressed a wish to be granted the right 
to choose for itself the location of its seat, and eliminate the two-seat system, but 
in the successive treaties, EU member state governments have continued to 
reserve this right for themselves. While they did abandon the third seat of 
Parliament, Luxembourg, two decades ago, the rival demands of Belgium 
(Brussels) and France (Strasbourg) to base the parliament in their country has 
prevented a final agreement as to which city would become the sole seat of 
parliament. 
Moving various files and equipment between the two cities takes ten large trucks 
and the costs for two locations are estimated at 200 million euros a year. A force 
of 30 people loads the trucks for the 400 km journey between the two locations. 
Around 5000 people attached to the European Parliament, such as parliamenta-
rians, advisors, clerks and journalists, also move between Brussels and 
Strasbourg. Most of the parliamentarians are against using Strasbourg, and 
various initiatives have been taken over the years to have Brussels as the sole 
location.”  
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Parliament#Locationthan the application of well-defined rules. In the context
of the Single Market, that is not surprising: “nationalis-
tic” rules would appear discriminatory and be challenged
by the European Commission. Instead of having such
rules, governments endorse the EU non-discriminatory
rules. Governments commit themselves not to discrimi-
nate and in exchange for that they benefit from a similar
commitment from other member states. At the margin of
those rules, however, governments have an incentive to
behave opportunistically and circumvent the rules to pur-
sue their own nationalistic interest, while insisting that
the rules be enforced by other countries.
Economic nationalism may take several forms depend-
ing on its motivations. It may be proactive (subsidies,
nationalisation, political influence etc.) or defensive
(blocking a transnational merger). It can affect produc-
tive decisions (subsidies for locating a plant in a specific
area) as well as control (maintaining a hard core of
domestic shareholders). It can be enacted by a national or
a local government, and there are also instances of pan-
European economic nationalism.
We now discuss the various forms
of nationalistic interventions in
greater detail.
2.1 Influencing the location 
of firms
Both local and national govern-
ments often offer subsidies or
other forms of exceptional condi-
tions (such as providing infra-
structure) to convince foreign
firms to locate in their jurisdiction
rather than elsewhere. There are
many examples of such behaviour,
such as bidding for the Olympic
Games, lobbying to attract large
international projects, and so on.
The nationalist bids for location of
large investment projects has often
led to costly compromises, like the
dispersion of Airbus’s production
sites across countries and the
cyclical motion of the European
Parliament between Brussels and
Strasbourg, with a staff mostly
located in Luxembourg (see Box-
es 6.1 and 6.2).
2.2 Influencing control
Governments often try to make sure that the leading firm
in a sector is nationally-owned. Thus, they sometimes
block acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign firms
and sometimes support acquisitions of foreign firms by
domestic firms. Recent examples abound:
• The French government recently stepped in to pre-
vent the Italian utility company Enel from taking over
a private banking group that had diversified into the
sectors of water and utility, Suez. The government
instructed the national gas monopoly, Gaz de France,
to merge with Suez, thus resulting in the partial pri-
vatisation of Gaz de France and the partial nationali-
sation of Suez.
• Also recently, the Italian government pressured
Telecom Italia not to sell its mobile phone sub-
sidiary,1 on the grounds that it is the only Italian-




The spread of the Airbus workforce over the different corporation locations 
Airbus, along with Boeing, is one of the two main aircraft manufacturers in the 
world. It was created in 1970 as a merger between the French Aérospatiale and 
the German Deutsche Airbus companies. The Spanish Casa and British Aero-
space companies joined later. As of 2005, it is basically on a par with Boeing in 
terms of market share. 
Historically, the French, English, German and Spanish governments have had an 
important stake in Airbus and still retain a substantial fraction of its capital. As a 
result, they have been able to influence the location of economic activity on the 
basis of political criteria. This allocation is shown in Table 6.1. Most of the 
workforce is spread over the four countries, and the fraction of employment that 
each country has is in line with its stake in the capital: France and Germany, the 
two most important partners, have the greater share of employment.
a) Although 
that seems natural to most non-economists, from the point of view of economic 
efficiency there is no reason why, more than 25 years after the merger, the 
distribution of production sites should match the distribution of ownership. In 
private corporations, the two should typically be unrelated. 
The scattering of production sites is partly the legacy of history, as Airbus is the 
outcome of a merger among several national companies. However, for mergers to 
enhance efficiency some restructuring has to take place, and one may believe that 
nationalistic considerations have slowed it and contributed to maintain too many 
of the initial production sites in operation. 
Boeing’s production is also scattered across several sites; however, most of these 
are in the United States. Most importantly, Boeing’s dispersion reflects efficiency 
considerations such as comparative advantage and the international division of 
labour, rather than political economy considerations. For example, part of the 
new 787 will be manufactured in Australia and Canada, two countries that have 
no significant stake in Boeing. 
a) According to our own computations, as of the end of 2004, other than publicly traded 
shares (i.e. those that are bought and sold by various shareholders on the stock market), the 
distribution of ownership was as follows: France 33.2, Germany 33.2, the UK 27.5, and 
Spain 6 percent. As can be seen from Table 6.1, the distribution of ownership closely 
matches that of employment. 
Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus#Workforce_by_sites
1 According to Reuters, Sep. 11 2006, “Italian newspapers said (…) that
the British buyout firms Apax Partners and Permira, as well as the Texas
Pacific Group, an American firm, were considering bids.”EEAG Report 135
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• The US Congress blocked the acquisition of US ports
by the state-owned Dubai Ports (DP World) on the
grounds that it could be a threat to national security.
Other examples are provided at the end of Section 4.
2.3 Political intervention to obtain contracts
In some sectors, such as those involving oil concessions
or weapons, politicians often intervene to secure con-
tracts for a national industry. They can pay for these con-
tracts in the form of support for the client government in
foreign policy circles. This mechanism can also be a
channel of indirect state aid, especially in contexts like
that of the Single Market where it has to be authorised by
the European Commission: a government can lend
money to a foreign government in exchange for a bona
fide agreement that the latter will purchase goods and
services from domestic firms. There is also a local bias
in the allocation of procurement contracts, as politicians
typically believe they can increase their votes by picking
local companies.
2.4 State aid
Many European countries have a long tradition of subsi-
dising “national champions”, be it in the high-tech indus-
try, banking or in declining sectors. Again, these subsi-
dies are discretionary, in that the
government picks a number of
“winners” and pays for their losses,
rather than subsidise an industry,
product, activity, or factor of pro-
duction as a whole. It is usually
observed that such state aid is very
difficult to remove politically when
it appears that the subsidised firm
is not successful. An archetypal
example is the French computer
manufacturer Bull, which in 2002
lost 500 million euros out of a total
turnover of 1500 millions and cost
the French taxpayer 2 billion euros
in just a decade. In many cases, big
firms are supported by the govern-
ment because they are “too big to
fail”. However, subsidies also seem
hard to eliminate for smaller firms
like Bull.
2.5 State ownership
State ownership is no longer popu-
lar, but has long been an instrument of economic nation-
alism. Economically, state ownership may be justified in
case of market failures, like the existence of a “natural
monopoly”, due to increasing returns to scale, although
many economists tend to believe that such sectors are
better regulated, as the lack of incentives of state monop-
olies tends to generate larger inefficiencies than increas-
ing returns to scale. 
2.6 Influencing standards
Nationalism may also arise when setting international
standards. A country may boost the value of domestical-
ly generated patents by imposing its own standards.
Many historical examples abound. For example, in the
domain of colour TV, the French standard SECAM com-
peted with the German PAL and the US NTSC. Because
the two latter were widely in use, France did not manage
to impose SECAM on but a handful of countries. In more
recent years the EU has also tried to impose standards
developed in Europe rather than elsewhere. It was suc-
cessful with the GSM mobile phone standard but less so
in high definition television (HDTV).
3. Motivations of economic nationalism
In this section we discuss the economic arguments that
may explain the rise of economic nationalism, coming
Table 6.1    
Distribution of Airbus workforce among different locations 
 Workforce  Percentage  of  total 
workforce 
A. FRANCE  19 400  38.9 
Toulouse 14  100  28.4 
Saint-Nazaire 2  200  4.5 
Nantes 1  900  3.8 
Albert   1 100  1.1 
B. GERMANY  18 400  37.0 
Hamburg 11  200  22.5 
Bremen 3  050  6.1 
Nordenham 2  100  4.2 
Varel 1  200  2.4 
Laupheim 900  1.8 
C. UNITED KINGDOM  8 700  17.5 
Bristol 4  400  8.8 
Broughton 4  300  8.7 
D. SPAIN 2 700 5.5
Madrid 2  200  4.5 
Cadiz 500  1.0 
E. OTHER  505 1.0 
Washington, DC, USA  165  0.3 
Wichita, USA  140  0.3 
Miami, USA  100  0.2 
Beijing, China  100  0.2 
Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus#Workforce_by_sitesfrom either benevolent governments trying to maximise
the welfare of domestic citizens or politicians driven by
private concerns.
3.1 National security
As exemplified by the above-mentioned Dubai Ports
case, one argument in favour of nationalistic intervention
is that some sectors are “strategic” in the sense that their
activity has some impact on national interests beyond the
economic sphere. This argument has been used by
France to shield a number of sectors from foreign
takeovers, by requiring government approval. These sec-
tors are listed in Box 6.3. 
It is not clear why national ownership of a sensitive sec-
tor should increase national security. If the goal is to pre-
vent some undesirable activities from taking place with-
in that sector – for example, the reason that was invoked
for the inclusion of casinos as a strategic sector was
money laundering – then one can simply ban or regulate
these activities. There is no reason why a foreign private
owner would have more incentives to engage in these
activities than a national, private owner.
The general economic point here is that money is odour-
less, and that foreign owners would (and should) max-
imise profits just like domestic ones, and thus make the
same decisions. However, one could conceive of foreign
takeovers with undesirable, non-economic effects. What
if a hostile, foreign government takes over a weapons
manufacturer to buttress a programme of weapons of
mass destruction, or accumulates treasury bills in order
to massively dump them on the market some day in order
to brutally disrupt the economy? Our answer to that
question is that “hostile” governments should be clearly
defined by a parliamentary bill, in the spirit of the restric-
tions imposed by the US Congress on some countries.
Otherwise, defining strategic sectors and imposing gov-
ernment approval for any takeover in these sectors will
favour discretionary behaviour by the government to
please domestic lobbies and/or to derive private rents by
manipulating the structure of corporate ownership.
Furthermore, to the extent that the EU is a club of coun-
tries sharing the same values, with some degree of polit-
ical integration, blocking a takeover from another mem-
ber state on the grounds that it threatens national securi-
ty is dubious to say the least. 
3.2 Adequacy
Another issue is that domestic firms can be bought by,
say, foreign state-owned firms, and be poorly managed
because such firms would not maximise shareholder
value but pursue other objectives instead. This indeed is
a non-trivial issue. In some sense, if it is known before-
hand that an economic agent is going to perform an inef-
ficient action, it is always valuable for authorities to
block that action. This argument holds regardless of the
type of agent involved, whether it is a firm or an admin-
istration, private or public, domestic or foreign. Thus, it
is not a case of nationalism; rather, it is a case of pater-
nalism – that is prior government approval of private
transactions on the ground that agents may not be quali-
fied to perform them. Although there may be grounds for
some degree of paternalism (think of governments certi-
fying the skills of a medical doctor or an architect), in
many cases, it is impossible to tell in the first place how
well a firm’s new owners are going to do. We only know
that selection and competition eventually prevail, ensur-
ing that markets eliminate poor strategies. Thus, it is gen-
erally best not to interfere with property rights and to let
markets punish bad management.
Furthermore, the case for interven-
tion is probably weaker when it is a
foreign, inefficient entity that is
trying to buy a more efficient
domestic firm than when it is a
domestic, inefficient one. A poorly
managed foreign firm has to pay
domestic shareholders at least the
initial market value of the firm,
since that initial value reflects the
profit stream generated by the
incumbent management. There-
fore, the original shareholders can-
not be worse off, and all the losses
generated by the new, inefficient




“Strategic sectors” in France 
By decree of March 7 2003, the French government has defined a number of 
”sensitive sectors” where foreign direct investment is subject to prior approval by 
the government. These sectors are: 
• casinos 
• security activity 
• biotechnology, antidotes 
• communication interception material 
• computer systems safety 
• “dual technology”, i.e. any civilian technology with potential military 
applications 
• cryptology 
• defence and weapons 
Source: Deloitte Finance, January 2006. EEAG Report 137
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foreign owners. Since their welfare is not taken into
account by the domestic government, it should be less
worried than if it were a domestic, inefficient firm that
tries to purchase a more efficient one. What about the
domestic workers? They may indeed suffer from such
inefficient management, but only to the extent that
domestic labour markets do not work properly.
Otherwise, they are paid the equilibrium wage and if,
say, mismanagement leads them to inefficiently lose
their job at that firm, they can be expected to find anoth-
er job at the same market wage. As long as the firm’s
owners pay market prices for all their inputs, they bear
the financial consequences of their choices. And, again,
the issue is not particularly associated with the entity
being foreign. 
To conclude: While the issue of whether governments
should intervene to correct mistakes by individual agents
is complex and beyond the scope of this chapter, there is
no presumption that such interventions are more war-
ranted in the case of foreign residents than in the case of
domestic ones.
3.3 Preserving employment
Another, oft-invoked reason is the goal of preserving or
fostering employment. Here, interventions may take
different forms. One may subsidise declining industries
to prevent job destruction, for example, or block a for-
eign takeover on the grounds that foreign owners will
be less sensitive to the goal of preserving employment.2
(That may be especially relevant if the government can
pressure domestic owners to take it into account; on the
other hand, the argument would not apply if a domestic
owner would only maximise profits, just like a foreign
owner.)
While this necessity may sound obvious to the layman, it
is not necessarily obvious why employment should be an
objective. If the labour market is functioning properly,
there will be an equilibrium level of unemployment that
reflects the frictions involved in the process of matching
jobs and workers. A voluntary policy of creating jobs
will interfere with that process in an inefficient way.
Some workers will be diverted to the new jobs while
their social value would have been greater looking for a
more productive job elsewhere. At the same time, the
new jobs will make the labour market tighter, thus rais-
ing wage pressure in other firms, which will inefficient-
ly destroy some socially productive jobs. 
In practice, we know that labour markets in Europe are
heavily distorted, with persistent unemployment and
long unemployment spells. Improving the labour market
is then a legitimate goal, which has been discussed in
several previous EEAG reports.3 However, the tools of
economic nationalism are likely to be inappropriate, and
often ineffective, in addressing labour market issues. For
example, if unemployment is too high because of a bind-
ing minimum wage, then subsidising firms in declining
industries may positively contribute to national welfare.
The reason is that firms tend to destroy too many jobs,
relative to the social optimum, as the minimum wage
creates a wedge between the private cost of labour and its
social cost. But it is much more efficient to abolish the
minimum wage, while replacing it, if needed, by a less
distorting redistributive tool. Barring such an option, to
subsidise firms in an efficient way, one would have to
subsidise employment uniformly, by giving to each firm
an amount equal to the wedge for each of its employed.
The cost of such a policy is huge, and since it has to be
financed by a tax levied on consumers, which reduces
their purchasing power, it is no more than an indirect,
burdensome way of reducing the minimum wage. 
In many other cases, nationalist policies will fail to cre-
ate jobs in the medium run. The reason is that unem-
ployment will only be temporarily affected by temporary
spurts of job creation (like those generated by the build-
ing of a factory) and tend to return to its equilibrium rate,
which is determined by the institutional characteristics of
the labour market.4 Furthermore, repeated discretionary
interventions may weaken the public’s perception that
fundamental labour market reform is needed, and there-
fore the government’s incentive to address the roots of
the problem.
3.4 Poles and externalities
It has long been recognised that there are agglomeration
externalities in the location of economic activity. That is,
under certain parameters, a firm is more productive if it
locates where economic activity is high.5 The benefits
are numerous: denser markets, access to services that are
not available elsewhere, cheaper or better public infra-
structures, and so on. Hence, economic activity is con-
centrated in “poles” like big cities. Within a given econ-
omy, there is a substantial degree of arbitrariness and
path dependence in the formation of such poles. Aregion
2 A notorious example is the closing by Renault, a partially state-owned
French automotive manufacturer famous for its social concerns, of its
Belgian plant at Vilvoorde. At that time it was pointed out in the press
that these concerns did not seem to apply to foreign employees.
3 See, in particular, EEAG (2002) Chapter 6, EEAG (2004) Chapters 2
and 3, and EEAG (2005) Chapters 2 and 3.
4 See also Section 4 in Chapter 4 for an analysis of how labour market
institutions determine equilibrium unemployment in the context of the
Scandinavian economies.
5 See, for example, Scitovsky (1954), Caballero and Lyons (1990) and
Krugman (1991).may develop into the economic centre (or “core”) of an
economy for historical reasons and keep that status long
after those reasons have disappeared.
Do residents of a region have an interest in living in the
economic “core” rather than the periphery? The answer
is a qualified yes. To the extent that one is more produc-
tive in the “core”, this guarantees higher living stan-
dards, which creates an interest in attracting economic
activity in a given place. Otherwise, workers receive
lower wages and they would have to move to the core to
get the corresponding wage. Since moving is costly, it is
better for a region to evolve into a core rather than a
periphery. On the other hand, if agglomeration has costs
like pollution, congestion and high land prices, this may
induce less skilled people (or people with less big city
marketable skills) to stay in the periphery.
Furthermore, the location of headquarters of a firm mat-
ters because headquarters create agglomeration effects in
terms of the depth of the market for highly qualified
labour and business services in general, and are a magnet
for the location of more headquarters. Regions are there-
fore prepared to subsidise the location of new headquar-
ters (see Strauss-Kahn and Vives 2005 for US evidence.)
The location of headquarters also matters since proximi-
ty is relevant for the protection of the interests of the dif-
ferent stakeholders in a firm, such as workers, suppliers,
small shareholders and local communities. An implica-
tion is that in a downturn a firm may seek to minimise
staff cuts in its country of origin.6
When several economies integrate into a single market,
one may observe shifts in the regional distribution of
economic activity. Some firms may leave a pole for a
more efficient location, since they can now freely sell
their output within the single market regardless of where
they are located. This generates an incentive for nation-
ally elected politicians to stimulate the presence of eco-
nomic activity in their territory. 
Note that this argument only goes so far as to say that
there is a value in attracting firms in a given place. This
argument holds regardless of who owns these firms, and
does not say much about which industries should be
favoured – typically, those which generate these “agglo-
meration externalities”, which may be quite different
from the “strategic sectors”, usually referred to when
governments subsidise domestic business. 
Another type of effects is learning externalities, which
are usually invoked to justify subsidies to infant indus-
tries.7 Here the argument is that the more one produces
of a good, the more one accumulates knowledge in the
corresponding technology. Therefore, a country is more
productive in a given sector, the greater that country’s
total cumulative output in that sector was in the past.
Subsidising an infant industry, which is originally not
competitive, may thus help it survive once enough expe-
rience has been accumulated. In principle, the industry
can then live without the subsidies. This argument is
probably valid empirically, and explains why patterns of
specialisation tend to be self-reinforcing – that is, there
is no particular reason why Switzerland should produce
clocks and Germany optical instruments other than the
fact that these countries accumulated a lot of experience
in these sectors in the past. The question is: Does this
justify state intervention to favour a given sector?
Typically, one observes subsidies to either declining
industries, so as to “preserve jobs”, or nascent “high
tech industry”, to have a national leader in these sectors.
The economic value of forcing an economy to channel
resources to “high tech” sectors is however unclear. If
the learning potential there is high, specialising in such
industries may help achieve faster growth. On the other
hand, that process is associated with a rapid fall in the
relative price of the good, which may harm GDP growth
even though growth in “physical terms” is faster. For
example, semiconductors are certainly a high tech sec-
tor, but their price has fallen so rapidly that it is proba-
bly not a good idea to distort specialisation toward that
sector, rather than, say, having a strong tourism industry.
Indeed, such terms-of-trade effects seem important in
the case of Finland and Sweden due to these countries’
specialisation on ICT products, the relative price of
which have been falling. This is discussed in more detail
in Section 3 of Chapter 4 on the Scandinavian model in
this report.
Finally, these externalities should not be mixed with pure
“pecuniary” externalities, that is the effects of greater
demand for goods and services. While these externalities
exist and may have to be taken into account, they seldom
justify nationalistic interventions. We further discuss
their role in Section 4 below. 
3.5 Beggar-thy-neighbour policy and exerting 
monopoly power abroad: the transfer effect
The transfer effect arises from the fact that even a nation-
al government trying to maximise the welfare of domes-
tic citizens does not take into account the welfare of for-
eign residents. Such a government will object to a
EEAG Report 138
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6 See again footnote 2 in this chapter. 7 See Krugman (1987) and Lucas (1988).EEAG Report 139
Chapter 6
domestic firm charging monopoly prices at home,
because monopoly profits are a transfer between domes-
tic residents (from consumers to shareholders), while the
excess price charged by the monopoly is a distortion that
harms consumers. However, domestic residents benefit
from a national firm charging monopoly prices abroad
because they are not likely to care about the losses to for-
eign consumers. Therefore, a national government acting
in the interest of national residents may want to promote
monopoly for its national firms abroad but competition
between them at home. Finally, such a government is
likely to perceive it as the worst case if a foreign firm
operates at home with monopoly power, as the monopoly
profits are transferred abroad.
A social planner acting at a higher level (say the EU
level) would take into account the welfare of foreign
consumers and try to block nationalistic policies aimed
at buttressing national champions’ monopoly power
abroad. Conversely, a benevolent social planner at the
national level is willing to spend more resources on
blocking foreigners from extracting monopoly profits
from national consumers than an EU-wide social plan-
ner. The national residents’ losses from monopoly pric-
ing are equal to the full amount of profits transferred
abroad, while a higher-level social planner would only
take into account the distortions due to the fact that
monopoly pricing leads to a suboptimally low consump-
tion of the good. 
We can think of a number of examples where this trans-
fer effect leads, under certain circumstances, to national-
istic policies – especially in the context of a pan-
European move to deregulate markets that were initially
controlled by a handful of often state-owned domestic
firms. 
• The transfer effect may sometimes induce unilateral
deregulation: a country may want to deregulate uni-
laterally if it leads to perfect competition in its domes-
tic markets. By doing so, it eliminates monopoly rents
at home while still being able to reap any monopoly
rents from its domestic firms with sales abroad. This
is an example where nationalistic policy is also the
one which goes in the direction of greater economic
efficiency.
• However, if deregulation leads to less than perfect
competition, as is usually the case, the conclusion is
easily reversed. The reason is that in the initial, regu-
lated situation there are only a few national firms in
the market that share oligopoly profits and transfer
them to their owners who are national residents.
When foreign firms enter the market, some monopoly
rents will be transferred abroad, thus harming domes-
tic residents. This effect creates an incentive to block
deregulation at home. At the same time, the national
government may push for deregulation abroad to the
extent that it allows its domestic firms to enter these
markets and transfer monopoly rents to the home
economy.
When do we expect a government to opt for deregula-
tion? That would be the case if its firms in the relevant
sector have some cost advantage compared to their for-
eign competitors. It is then in the interest of the govern-
ment to push for deregulation both at home and abroad
because domestic firms are likely to conquer foreign
markets, while foreign monopolies are unlikely to make
it to the national market.8 Conversely, if the national
industry is less efficient than its competitors, the govern-
ment will be more likely to block deregulation, while
still trying its best to enter foreign markets. That incen-
tive may be particularly strong if there is a first mover
advantage in conquering market shares, for example, if it
is costly for customers to change their suppliers or if
those who produce earlier move down their learning
curve, thus accumulating a cost advantage over future
competitors.
Another potential explanation of economic patriotism
can be found in sectors where economies of scale and
size are important because of network or learning effects,
increased bargaining power in international input mar-
kets, or increased financial muscle. In those sectors, if
there are asymmetries among countries in terms of their
ability to merge their firms to create national champions,
countries and firms will have incentives to obtain a first
mover advantage by forming a national champion that
will consolidate as an European or global champion once
the European market integrates. The benefits of such a
champion will be enjoyed by the country in terms of the
local external effects of headquarters and the reaping of
monopoly profits from abroad (the transfer effect).
Public ownership introduces another asymmetry because
state-owned firms or firms in which a government keeps
a golden share are protected from foreign raiders. Still
another asymmetry may arise in terms of the differential
lobbying capacity in Brussels of firms and countries
according to size. Indeed, the weight of large European
firms and countries (such as France, Germany or Italy)
may make a large difference. In short, regulatory and
ownership asymmetries provide incentives to move first
8 Foreign entrants may in fact limit the ability of a dominant domestic
firm to charge monopoly prices by compelling it to charge a “limit price”
equal to their cost. In such a case foreign firms get no monopoly profits
from operating in the domestic economy but exert price discipline on the
dominant firm, which benefits domestic consumers.to take positions for an enlarged market while keeping
barriers at home. The recent turmoil in the energy sector
may be related to this potential explanation. Things are
more complex when one considers the acquisition of a
national champion. The transfer effect does not explain
per se why one might want to block foreign acquisition
of national champions. It is true that these champions’
profits would then be exported. But they should be
reflected in the market price paid by the buyer, so that
there is no transfer abroad in net present value terms. The
acquisition is then simply a financial swap, which has a
neutral effect on the international distribution of welfare.
But the analysis is more complicated if the acquisition
leads to a change in prices because consumers are then
affected. For example, a well-managed national public
monopoly will charge lower prices than a private monop-
oly, reflecting its concern for the consumers’ welfare. If
upon deregulation, for example, a national public
monopoly is bought by a foreign firm and remains a
monopoly, the price will rise. The share prices compen-
sate the domestic taxpayers for the profits transferred
abroad but the domestic consumers are not compensated
for the higher prices. 
The row between France and Italy over the acquisitions
of Electricité de France in 2003 illustrates the reluctance
of national governments to engage in reciprocal deregu-
lation (Box 6.4).
Another area where the transfer effect may lead to eco-
nomic nationalism is that of intellectual property.
Patents owned by domestic firms increase their ability to
obtain monopoly rents from the rest of the world. With
respect to patents held by foreign firms, rents are trans-
ferred in the opposite direction. The consequences are
threefold:
• A national government can lobby to impose its own
technological standards upon the rest of the world,
thus artificially raising demand for goods with
domestic patents. It may keep its own standard
instead of a more efficient or more widely used inter-
national one. This leads to inefficiencies in the nature
and/or number of standards.
• A national government has an incentive not to recog-
nise foreign patents and copyright, while at the same
time lobbying aggressively for foreign recognition of
its own patents.
• There may be excess investment in R&D, as the
outcome of inefficient patent races. These ineffi-
ciencies arise because firms fail to internalise the
part of their profits that comes from customers
poached from their competitors (the business steal-
ing effect). Furthermore, their R&D efforts may be
redundant if their competitors work toward the
same innovation. This phenomenon may lead to
nationalistic interventions to the extent that the
patent race is international and the research publicly
funded. At the European level, one may indeed cite
examples of research projects (such as Galileo or
Quaero)9 that seem inefficient on the grounds that
they aim at duplicating innovations that already
exist, with the only difference that intellectual prop-
erty rights would be European.
How can one reduce the incentives to pursue these inef-
ficient policies? An obvious answer may be to coordinate
policies across countries. That is indeed what the EU,
under the impulse of the Commis-
sion, has been trying to do since the
inception of the Single Market, in
particular by promoting policies
such as deregulation and directives
that prevent a country from dis-
criminating against other member
states in their access to its domestic
market. Such policies reduce the
level of monopoly rents and there-
fore the size of the transfers that
can be extracted from foreign
countries. They also create a level




Electricité de France in Italy 
The saga of Electricité de France (EDF) investments in Italy illustrates how 
nationalistic motivations may lead to a war of attrition in the game of opening 
one’s market to foreign competitors.  
In May 2001, EDF started acquiring shares in the Italian electricity company 
Montedison. The move took place in a context where electricity markets were 
gradually opening to takeovers and foreign competition in Italy, while EDF 
remained a state monopoly in France. This situation gave EDF an edge in pre-
empting market shares for the future liberalised energy market, while Italian 
firms could not make a symmetrical move by investing in France. 
The Italians retaliated by passing a law that limited EDF’s voting rights to 2 per-
cent, despite the fact that it had acquired 4 percent of the shares. That provision 
was subsequently used by the Italians to bargain with the French government 
over the opening of the French market: The provision limiting EDF’s voting 
rights in Italy would be lifted in exchange for an access of the Italian company 
Enel to the French energy market. However, the recent counter-move by the 
French government to block the acquisition of Suez by Enel, by sponsoring a 
merger between Suez and Gaz de France, suggests that commitment was not very 
credible. 
9 Galileo is a European competitor to the
US-American GPS positioning system,
while Quaero is a web search engine pro-
ject sponsored by the French and German
governments. Note that Galileo may be
defended on the grounds of national securi-
ty concerns.EEAG Report 141
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that prevents national governments from preserving their
champions’ monopoly rents at home while bidding for
oligopoly rents abroad. But that strategy is not without
shortcomings. Implementation and enforcement of such
directives remain in the hands of national governments.
Individual countries may want to delay implementation
in order to benefit from the transfer effect as long as pos-
sible. As a consequence, an inefficient war of attrition
arises. Also, countries whose national champions are
inefficient and likely to be eliminated may resist such
policies, despite coordination, since they will transfer
monopoly rents abroad but not receive any in compensa-
tion.10 In some sense, one has to compensate these coun-
tries. An obvious suggestion is to synchronise the reform
with another one (say deregulation of a sector where
these countries have a comparative advantage) from
which they can benefit.
3.6 Political economy and private rents 
The preceding discussion analysed the extent to which
economic nationalism may be beneficial to the welfare
of a nation as a whole. In addition to that, nationalistic
policies may benefit politicians – and, more generally,
the elite – to the extent that private rents can be derived
from it. These rents may take several forms:
• Buying a political clientele in order to be re-elected
• Investing in symbolic, visible projects in order to
enhance one’s own prestige (hosting the Olympic
Games, building the largest library or cathedral
ever, etc.)
• Distributing rents within networks of friends (“crony
capitalism”)
• The revolving door (for example, E.On in Germany
has on its payroll the former Chancellor, the former
Minister for Economics, and the former Secretary of
State for Energy)
• Undercover finance of political parties in exchange of
favours. To achieve that goal, many techniques are
available and some of them – as extracting a bribe
from procurement contracts – are not necessarily
nationalistic in nature. However, there clearly is
scope for an incumbent government to use state-
owned firms for political financing, and this option
would be much less convenient should these firms be
private and/or foreign-owned.11
These motivations generate different kinds of biases. The
political clientele motivation may induce governments to
resist deregulation and openness to foreign competition
to the extent that they use public services providers and
the like to manipulate the price system in favour of
selected groups of voters. Hence, for example, the pric-
ing policy of a public firm may involve an implicit sub-
sidy to these groups. If competitors were allowed to
enter, they could soak other groups out of the firms’cus-
tomer base; the firm would eventually remain only with
its subsidised customers, and thus incur losses. In the
end, the subsidy would have to be removed, which
would be detrimental to the politicians.
The network motivation induces the élite to retain con-
trol of a number of firms, which allows them to
exchange benefits in the form of board seats or stock
options. As argued below, this probably comes at the
expense of good governance and competitiveness,
which means that a takeover of a firm controlled by the
network by an outsider would enhance efficiency. To the
extent that such a takeover threatens the rents accruing
to the network, and that outsiders are likely to come
from abroad, the network has an interest in lobbying for
nationalistic policies which would block such a move
(see again Box 6.4).12
4. The economic costs of nationalism
While the preceding section has analysed the potential
causes of nationalistic policies, we now study in greater
detail the nature of the economic costs it imposes on
society. We study five different aspects of these costs:
Sectoral diversion of resources, lack of market discipline
and poor corporate governance, productive inefficiency
at the firm level, distortions in competition, and coordi-
nation failures.
4.1 Sectoral diversion of resources
The most obvious cost of nationalistic policies is that
they often divert resources from more to less socially
profitable activities. That is especially true of policies
that aim at promoting “poles” and taking advantage of
externalities in contexts where these externalities are in
10 Clearly, that is likely to happen if their national producer is not too
inefficient. Otherwise, the efficiency gains to domestic consumers from
switching to foreign suppliers will exceed the monopoly rent transferred
abroad. 
11 The evidence on such activities is scarce, given the incentives to hide
evidence and block investigations. However, this possibility has been at
least considered in the French “Taiwan fregates” scandal. In this com-
plex case, the French national champion Thomson had sold warships to
Taiwan. A number of intermediaries, several of them close to prominent
politicians, had received bribes. The suspicion that part of these bribes
were transferred to the Socialist Party was voiced. Another characteris-
tic of illegal party financing scandals is that parties opposed on the polit-
ical spectrum often collude (see e.g. Pujadas and Rhodes 1999).
12 To be sure, the network can also defend its rents while bypassing the
government, for example, by playing on the seniority structure of shares.
The point here is that the existence of rents creates incentives to support
nationalistic policies.fact poorly understood. Atypical example is the Olympic
Games, often presented as being good for the economy
in terms of GDP and job creation. Although direct eco-
nomic “benefits” are documented, substantial controver-
sy remains.13 The studies usually ignore the alternative
use of the resources that are channelled into the produc-
tion of the Games. If one were to take this into account,
the conclusion is that organising the Olympic Games is
probably inferior to spending the same amount of money
on more useful public goods (health, education, roads,
housing projects etc.).14
The key point here is that one has to distinguish between
any true externality generated by a project (environment,
learning etc.), as discussed above, and pure pecuniary
externalities that consist in boosting economic activity
thanks to sheer spending. The latter is desirable only to
the extent that economic activity is believed to be ineffi-
ciently low, which may be true because there is insuffi-
cient competition in goods markets, rigidities in the
labour market, or because the economy is in a temporary
slump. Otherwise, people are artificially induced to work
too hard or in the wrong sectors. Furthermore, even if
stimulating activity is desirable, that does not imply that
one should forget about the economic benefits of a pro-
ject: the socially most profitable projects should still
come first. 
4.2 Lack of market discipline and poor corporate 
governance
A number of aspects of economic nationalism are
detrimental to an efficient allocation of resources as
they weaken market discipline, thus reducing incen-
tives at all levels of a hierarchy. This problem arises
not only for firms that are partly or totally owned by
the state, but also, more generally, for firms that
receive state aid or private firms whose management is
controlled by networks of influence rather than share-
holder democracy.
Afirm that receives state aid has little interest in cutting
costs and in improving product quality, as losses are
expected to be offset by the government. The firm’s
managers will have little incentive to rationalise pro-
duction processes, to recruit workers adequately, to
resist pressure for wage increases and to innovate. If
managers’political connections are strong enough, they
also face little threat of being dismissed for poor per-
formance. Or their perceived cost for being dismissed
may be small, as they can rely on their network of influ-
ence to find other prestigious and well-rewarded posi-
tions. On the other side, regulators have little incentives
to enforce rules and issue warnings if they are members
of the same networks as the CEOs of the firms they are
supposed to supervise. As networks often reward their
members by offering them positions in the private sec-
tor, civil servants face a conflict of interest between
their own career concerns and their monitoring duties.
Furthermore, if the state itself is a shareholder, it may
assign to the firm goals that are motivated by politics
rather than profitability. The government will then nat-
urally be reluctant to retaliate against a CEO who fails
to deliver adequate profits (see Box 6.5 on the Crédit
Lyonnais scandal). In the case of a publicly listed com-
pany, which may potentially end up in the hands of for-
eigners, the government will be tempted to indirectly
condone mistakes made by the management by buying
the shares when disgruntled shareholders sell them, in
order to preserve national ownership. (This is illustrat-
ed by Airbus’s recent troubles, which are discussed in
Box 6.6.).
Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) have documented and
quantified the negative effect of crony capitalism on
shareholder value in large French firms. These authors
first find that the importance of the network of former
civil servants in France is huge: more than 50 percent of
the assets on the French stock market are managed by
former top civil servants. Furthermore, the network is
effective in securing positions for its members. The pro-
portion of former civil servants who are graduates of the
Ecole Nationale d’Administration in boards is 16 percent
when their CEO graduated from that school, but only
6 percent otherwise. Similarly, the average proportion of
former civil servants who graduated from Ecole
Polytechnique in boards is 3 percent but goes up to
12 percent whenever the CEO is also a former civil ser-
vant who graduated from that school. Finally, and most
interestingly, network members shelter themselves from
market discipline: While the average CEO’s probability
of losing his or her job goes up by 4 percent when the
return on assets falls by 6 percent, the effect is quantita-
tively and statistically insignificant for the members of
the network. The authors also point out that network
CEOs typically hold several directorships on other
boards, which has a negative impact on rates of returns,
and that stock markets react positively to acquisitions
made by non-members but not to acquisitions made by
members. This latter effect suggests that the market
believes that the network members will not use the
acquisition to exploit margins of increased profitability
EEAG Report 142
Chapter 6
13 See Berman et al. (2000), Hotchkiss et al. (2003) and Veraros et al.
(2004).
14 An exception is when the public goods cannot be provided otherwise
because of political or institutional constraints and the Olympic Games
provide the rallying point to do so.EEAG Report 143
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in favour of shareholders but to redistribute private rents
in favour of the network itself.
4.3 Productive inefficiency at the firm level
Another aspect of economic nationalism is that it impos-
es wrong choices on firms. A traditional example is the
Concorde, which was a technological marvel valued as
such by politicians, but which turned out to be a poor
idea in terms of market potential, in part because of its
design. In the case of Airbus, much more attention is
being paid to the market, but, as Box 6.1 showed, the
organisation of production is biased by political influ-
ence. The proliferation of production sites reduces pro-
ductivity for several reasons. First, more resources have
to be devoted to transportation and coordination. Second,
some plants may be too small and not exploit economies
of scale sufficiently. Third, some plants may be located
in inadequate places that lack an appropriate supply of
skilled workers, and of services and amenities required
to attract top managers. This has an adverse impact on
the quality and cost of the workforce.
4.4 Distortions in competition 
State-supported companies also distort competition. If
their creditors know that they will be supported by the
state in case of losses, they have a lower risk of bank-
ruptcy, and consequently will benefit from a lower cost
of funds. This will give them an edge over their com-
petitors, which may help eliminate them. As an example,
the partly state-owned airline Airfrance has reached a
96 percent market share in the French domestic market,
after eliminating a number of its rivals, despite the fact
that these maintained lower prices.
In that respect, partial privatisation of a publicly owned
firm does not bring many economic benefits, as long as
the government retains a substantial minority stake. The
incentives for public recapitalisation in case of financial
troubles remain large, with the associated distortions in
competition. The company may be used for other goals
than shareholder value (accounting tricks to comply with
public finance objectives,15 overemployment for social
purposes,16 etc.). 
Other distortions to competition may arise from the con-
flicts of interest that the state faces as a regulator, a law
enforcer and a provider of public infrastructures, on the
Box 6.5 
The Crédit Lyonnais scandal 
The Crédit Lyonnais scandal illustrates a number of pitfalls of economic nationalism: 
• The interference of politicians that leads to confusion between partisan goals and the goal of maximising shareholder value. 
• The role of networks of influence and the private rents that are derived from them. 
• The lack of market discipline, which leads to poor risk management. 
• The likely inability of state ownership to prevent illicit activities from taking place. 
In 1995, the French, state-owned banking giant Crédit Lyonnais was bailed out by the French government, which transferred all 
the bank’s debt to an ad hoc company, “Consortium de Réalisation”. The cost to the French taxpayer, depending on estimates, 
ranged from 10 to 30 billion euros, up to 2.5 percent of GDP at that time.  
What happened? Under the leadership of Jean-Yves Haberer, a member of the French civil service elite, Crédit Lyonnais had 
pursued a policy of aggressive expansion, buying assets and making loans that turned out to be quite poor. Among the operations
made, one example was a “major office block development in the northern French town of Lille that helped local politicians to 
regenerate the town but then proved difficult to let” [ERisk.com]. Indeed, Haberer’s defence was that he was working in close 
cooperation with the French government “as he expanded the bank and preserved jobs in French industry by extending credit to 
shaky companies”. Thus, political interference blurred any notion of risk/return management and led to an accumulation of 
projects that eventually threatened the company’s solvency.  
Another dubious operation involved the purchase of the US insurance company Executive Life, which, according to US 
authorities, was in violation of regulations. Yet another example is the 1987–1990 purchase of two film production studios – 
including the MGM studios – with Crédit Lyonnais funds by two Italian businessmen, Giancarlo Parretti and Florio Fiorini, who 
were both involved in financial scandals at that time. These businessmen managed to convince Crédit Lyonnais to repeatedly lend
them large sums which vanished as MGM was forced into bankruptcy by its other creditors, following a liquidy crisis. This 
episode shows that state ownership did not prevent barely legal transactions from taking place. Quite the contrary, state 
involvement as the firm main shareholder creates a conflict of interest for those who have to enforce the law.
a)
a) The criminal charges associated with the Crédit Lyonnais case are summarised at http://www.sgrm.com/art43.htm.
15 In 1998 the French government “stole” the pension fund of the state-
owned France Telecom in order to better meet the Maastricht criteria for
monetary union (The Register, 30 Nov. 1998):
http://www.theregister.co.uk/1998/11/30/french_prepare_further_france
_telecom/.
16 An example, among many, is the recent French government interfer-
ence in the decision by SOGERMA, a subsidiary of Airbus/EADS, to
close a plant near Bordeaux in France. For details,
http://fr.news.yahoo.com/23052006/290/le-gouvernement-veut-une-
solution-alternative-pour-la-sogerma.html.one hand, and as an owner of one of the competitors, on
the other hand. In this case it is very difficult to believe
that the regulator can maintain its independence.
4.5 Coordination failures
An obvious aspect of economic nationalism is that its
potential benefits for an individual country are usually
offset by the nationalistic policies of competing coun-
tries, while the costs in terms of distortions usually
remain. Take, for example, the transfer effect. As argued
above, each country has an incentive to delay its own
deregulation, so as to benefit as long as possible from the
transfer effect; in equilibrium, everybody delays deregu-
lation, and the attempt to extract transfers from neigh-
bouring countries therefore fails. The only effect that
remains is that consumers pay a high monopoly price for
too long, which harms everybody. 
Similarly, consider the infant industry argument.
Assume a country subsidises its firms in a given sector.
If, at the same time, foreign countries subsidise their
own national champions, the home country may end up
unable to accumulate enough knowledge so as to com-
pete with the rest of the world. The national champions
will never become competitive, and one will never be
able to remove the subsidies. Furthermore, the exis-
tence of the national champion
reallocates market shares away
from foreign competitors, which
reduces the speed at which they
learn, and leads to duplication of
R&D costs. Obviously, these two
effects are very harmful for the
world economy.
The available empirical studies of
the effects of Airbus on world wel-
fare highlight these effects, and
tend to conclude that, if anything,
there is a negative effect on world
welfare. As Neven and Seabright
(1995) point out, the main positive
effect of Airbus on world welfare is
that its entry increased competition
in the aircraft market, thus reduc-
ing prices. However, the estimate is
small, essentially because at the
time of their study, there was a
third participant (the American 
aircraft manufacturer McDonnel
Douglas) in the market. To be sure,
Boeing and McDonnel Douglas
merged thereafter, but it is unclear that the merger would
have taken place if Airbus had been absent from the mar-
ket. As for European residents, they benefit from the
transfer effect: Boeing’s monopoly rents are reduced and
transferred to Airbus. But European residents are also
those who pay for Airbus’s subsidies, which benefit con-
sumers in the rest of the world. Finally, duplication of
R&D costs and reduced learning effects at Boeing also
tend to generate negative effects for world welfare.
Neven and Seabright conclude that entry by Airbus has
benefited European consumers (because of the transfer
effect) but harmed world consumers as a whole (see
Box 6.7). Clearly, the US government can be tempted to
reverse the transfer effect by subsidising Boeing such
that it expands its market share, which would eventually
leave both US and European consumers worse off than if
Airbus had not entered the market.
5. Will economic nationalism prevail?
Cross-border merger activity is gathering pace in
Europe. 2005 and 2006 saw large value mergers or
acquisitions such as Italy’s Unicredit of Germany’s HVB
in the banking industry and France’s Pernod Ricard of
the UK’s Allied Domecq in the food and drink sector.
The pace of activity in utilities has been especially hec-




Nationalism and corporate governance at Airbus 
As we have seen in Box 6.1, nationalistic concerns have distorted the production 
structure of Airbus to a substantial extent. The same is true for its governance 
structure, which has been repeatedly influenced by nationalism rather than 
economics. Initially, Airbus was a consortium of aerospace companies. When it 
was consolidated into a corporation, the French government intervened so as to 
retain the upper hand in the new parent company that was created, EADS. The 
trick was to make the French share bigger by forcing Aerospatiale, the French 
state-owned partner in Airbus, to merge with Matra, a French private defence and 
media company. This structure allowed for further discretionary interventions 
and anomalies. For example, the new company EADS had two CEOs: one 
German, one French. This clearly hampers the consistency and credibility of 
decisions, by replacing vision with constant bargaining between executives who 
presumably represent their own countries’ governments’ interests more than 
those of the other shareholders. The CEO position was finally unified, but, 
according to The Economist (9 Nov. 2006), crony capitalism again came into play 
as the French presidency had a big influence on the appointment of the new CEO.  
Most worryingly, when, after Airbus’s recent troubles, the initial private owner of 
Matra sold his shares, these were actually bought by a French public savings-and-
loans institution, the Caisse des Dépots et Consignations. That is, the French 
government, which induced the merger between Aérospatiale and Matra to keep 
French influence at critical levels, is now renationalising EADS in order to 
maintain that influence. Such discretionary behaviour clearly conveys the wrong 
signals to the managers, eventually putting them in the same situation as the 
managers of a pure publicly owned company that expects its losses to be bailed 
out by the taxpayers. By buying shares in order to preserve national ownership, 
the government is pushing their price above their true market value, thus 
damaging both the informational efficiency of financial markets and the 
incentives faced by managers. EEAG Report 145
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Suez in turn was solicited by Enel in 2006. E.On has
launched a bid for Endesa in the energy sector. France
Telecom has bought Spain’s Amena and Telefónica
(Spain) has acquired O2 (UK). Cross-border mergers are
an increasing proportion of the total, and activity within
the EU15 is now the most important component of this
trend, as stated in last year’s EEAG report. 
The wave of cross-border movements in Europe has
aroused the protectionist instincts of some European gov-
ernments. However, this does not necessarily mean that
governments are succeeding in their attempts. In Italy,
BBVA and ABN-Amro attempted to take over, respec-
tively, BNL and Antonveneta, to find the former
Governor of the Bank of Italy firmly opposed to the
deals. BBVA had already had trouble before when trying
to merge with Unicredito. But the Governor of the central
bank was forced to resign and in the end BNL was
acquired by BNP Paribas (itself an outcome of the trian-
gular battle BNP–SG–Paribas that ended up in the merg-
er BNP–Paribas because of the insistence of the French
government on a “French” solution), and the Antonveneta
bid eventually succeeded. At the same time, the Italian
Unicredito bought the German HVB and Poland was
attacked by Brussels when trying to put obstacles to the
absorption of a Polish bank by the merged Unicredito and
HVB. When E.On launched a bid for Spain’s Endesa,
solicited by the company to defend itself from Gas
Natural of Spain, the Spanish government reacted by
enlarging the powers of the energy regulator to potential-
ly put obstacles to the German firm. However, pressure
from Brussels has led Spain to backtrack on this route.
Another instance where the protectionist reaction failed
to deliver is the finally successful bid of the European
steel producing champion, Arcelor, by India’s Mittal. 
Despite all this, protectionist reactions have had, at
least, some partial success. When Spain’s Abertis pro-
posed a friendly merger with Italy’s Autostrade (high-
way concessions), the Italian government, at the insti-
gation of the Minister Di Pietro put up all kinds of
obstacles, and former European leaders, like Prodi
(president of the European Com-
mission) or Padoa-Schioppa
(member of the Executive Board
of the ECB), could not resolve the
situation. In essence, the Italian
government changed the rules for
highway concessions in the mid-
dle of the merger move, generat-
ing substantial material uncer-
tainty about the future concession
terms. At the end of 2006, Abertis
and Autostrade postponed the
deal until the regulation is clarified. For the moment,
European Commission pressure has not been able to
remove the obstacles to the deal. When Enel eyed
Suez, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin
reacted by proposing instead to merge Suez with the
public GdF. France, in this case, seems to be getting its
way: for example, the French government has been
allowed by the European Commission to keep a gold-
en share (a controlling stake) in a privatised GdF. A
French solution was also found in the merger of
Aventis with Sanofis in the pharmaceutical industry,
and the French government preferred to take a 20 per-
cent take in the ailing infrastructure provider, Alstom,
rather than accept a partial takeover by Siemens.
France has also passed a law allowing poison pills as
a defence against takeovers.
The UK stands alone as a case of no restrictions to for-
eign acquisitions. Indeed, the paramount example is the
City. The “big bang” opening London’s financial market
to compettition consolidated London as a leading inter-
national financial marketplace, but basically no invest-
ment banks from the UK were left.
Examples of foreign acquisition abound, like Tele-
fonica and O2 in telephony, Ferrovial and BAA (British
Airport Authority), Banco Santander and Abbey, and the
very recent move on Scottish Power by Iberdrola in the
energy sector. Santander was able to acquire Abbey
because the UK has an active competition policy and the
antitrust authority blocked the takeover of Abbey by
Lloyds TSB in 2001. In all these cases, as in the acquisi-
tions of the utilities Powergen and Thames Water by the
German RWE, the mergers have taken place in regulated
sectors where a “public service and security of supply”
concern is present. This open attitude should not be sur-
prising. In regulated sectors, the national regulator is in
control of the activities of the firm and can protect the
interests of the local consumers. 
In general, national governments and regulators have
considerable leeway in affecting the profitability of reg-
Box 6.7 
Global effects of Airbus 
In an influential study, Neven and Seabright (1995) calibrate a simple model of 
imperfect competition to estimate the effect of subsidies to Airbus on the welfare 
of consumers in Europe and elsewhere. They find only a small effect of Airbus’s 
entry on prices: – 3.5 percent. The estimated profit loss for Boeing (in 1995) is 
100 billion dollars, while Airbus’s profits are around 50 billion dollars. As prices 
are only moderately lower, the bulk of the lost profits are not appropriated by 
consumers but dissipated in the form of duplicate fixed costs and lower 
productivity.  ulated firms. If the industry has natural monopoly seg-
ments, like energy or transportation, the regulator will
retain power over investment plans, rates and quality in
the natural monopoly or bottleneck segment: transmis-
sion and distribution of electricity or the road in a high-
way concession. The impact on consumers or users of
the bottleneck segment is therefore basically in the
hands of the regulator. The government is responsible
for having in place a regulatory framework that induces
investment and the supply of quality at reasonable prices
for users.
In industries with no natural monopoly segments, like
banking, the role of competition policy authorities is
more direct in making sure that the merged firm has no
excessive market power. In summary, cross border merg-
ers are on the rise despite the obstacles put up by nation-
al authorities because of the pressure from Brussels – in
the banking sector Brussels now wants to limit the pow-
ers of central banks and national regulators to block for-
eign takeovers, for example – because of the discipline
imposed by international capital markets on firms quot-
ed in the stock market, and because of the fact that coun-
tries may fear retaliation if they shut their borders to
cross border mergers.
6. What to do?
We are now in a position to discuss what can be done to
address the challenges of economic nationalism. We
essentially offer two prescriptions: 
• Improving the effectiveness of competition policy by
breeding more coordination and harmonisation of
regulation.
• Phasing out the public ownership – whether it be full
or partial – of all corporations that operate in a com-
petitive environment
6.1 Coordinating competition policy
As stated in Section 1, our perspective is the welfare of
European citizens. We have seen that even if national
governments are benevolent in that they maximise the
welfare of their own citizens, they can act so as to harm
the welfare of the citizens of other EU countries. An
example we have given above is how individual coun-
tries can attempt to delay deregulation at home, while
benefiting from it abroad, which may lead to the deregu-
lation process being stalled for everybody. As far as such
discretionary nationalistic interventions are concerned,
the existing apparatus of European competition policy
partially addresses these issues. Unfortunately, these
tools are limited because of the different regulatory and
ownership structures in different countries. European
competition policy can control state aid and may be
effective in checking support to national champions. It
may also serve as an external commitment to not keep
inefficient institutions in business. But it still cannot
overcome regulatory barriers or limit the activities of
state-owned firms except under the competition statutes.
Regulatory asymmetries have to be overcome by har-
monisation of regulation, coordination of regulators, and
the establishment of European regulators. National regu-
lators should be integrated, sector by sector, into a
European system with common rules. In energy markets,
for example, transmission (high-tension grid) and trans-
port (pipelines) should be unbundled, because they are a
natural monopoly and the control of this bottleneck by
vertically integrated firms has high exclusionary poten-
tial. Interconnection capacity across boundaries should
be managed at the European level since firms and nation-
al regulators may not have the right incentives to provide
interconnection capacity across countries. In general, a
European system of regulators may be a commitment
device to avoid opportunism and resist political pressure.
A step in the right direction is the recent move by
Brussels to limit the leeway of central banks and nation-
al regulators to block foreign takeovers in the banking
sector.
There is also a timing issue. Barriers in EU countries
should be lifted simultaneously to avoid the strategic
gaming and positioning of large firms and countries that
follows from asymmetries. Indeed, a country that dis-
arms and liberalises earlier than others puts the consumer
first but may forego the opportunity to have some global
enterprises, strong enough to compete in an integrated
market. Such enterprises may give rise to positive local
spillovers in the national economy and capture rents
abroad. A piecemeal approach to liberalisation, with it
taking place at different speeds in different countries,
implies that large firms can use their lobbying capacity to
enlarge and consolidate positions in the wake of market
integration in regulated sectors. Those positions may
entail a first mover advantage in the presence of scale
and networks economies.
Still another danger is for Brussels to support pan-
European champions that later end up effectively pro-
tected from closure. As we argued in our 2006 EEAG
report, the political economy of European champions
may imply that the powers of European competition
policy, with the present institutional structure, are very
limited to deal with those cases. This is one instance
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where global coordination of competition policies
may help.
6.2 Fixing the state ownership issue
Distortions introduced by state-owned firms cannot be
addressed exclusively with competition policy. This is so
because public firms distort the market for corporate
control, and therefore industry restructuring, in a funda-
mental way. Our discussion suggests that one should
seriously consider introducing a European rule which
would severely restrict indefinite public ownership or
even partial such ownership of corporations. In this
chapter, we do not take a stand on the desirability of state
monopolies. Although policymakers have been increas-
ingly aware of their costs, there are traditional economic
arguments in their favour. For example, a state monopoly
can provide a public good that would be underprovided
by the market,17 or set prices efficiently under increasing
returns to scale (in this situation, a private monopoly
would arise under laissez-faire, and prices would be too
high).18 These arguments are now viewed as weak in
light of the poor performance of state monopolies in
terms of cost-cutting and innovation – it is indeed that
scepticism that has led to the waves of deregulations that
Europe has experienced since the 1980s. But these argu-
ments nevertheless have some economic legitimacy. On
the other hand, there is no good reason why there should
be a grey area where fully or partially publicly owned
firms compete on equal grounds with their private coun-
terparts. Such a situation leads to the distortions that we
have documented above. But, as we have seen, there are
a number of bad reasons why such situations arise.
Government support for economic activity should be
based on well-identified market failures. These failures
are market-specific, not firm-specific. The most appro-
priate interventions are therefore non-discriminatory
taxes and subsidies, not public ownership of a subset of
the market participants.
While our proposal to radically restrict public owner-
ship in competitive environments may sound revolu-
tionary, our analysis suggests that its implementation
would go a long way toward eliminating the incentives
for harmful nationalistic intervention. Indeed, most of
the remaining public ownership nowadays is a remnant
of the past that persisted for no good economic reason.
There is no talk of increasing public ownership any-
where in the developed world. It would be welcome to
conclude this disengagement process and to implement
an EU regulation restricting governments from owning
corporations. Such a rule would not be shockingly
intrusive in light of other EU interventions in national
policies, for which the economic justifications are not
so clear.
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